Academic Positions

Assistant Professor, School of Health Professions & School of Religion, Bob Jones University, 2022-

Hecht-Levi Postdcoctoral Fellow in Bioethics, Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University, 2020-2022
Also affiliated with the NIH Collaboratory Ethics and Regulatory Core


Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Virginia, 2020
M.A. Philosophy, Virginia Tech, 2011
M.Ed. Mathematics, Bob Jones University, 2007
B.A. Humanities cum laude, Bob Jones University, 2005


Journal Articles

  • Garland, Andrew, Stephanie Morain, and Jeremy Sugarman. “Do Clinicians Have a Duty to Participate in Pragmatic Clinical Trials?” American Journal of Bioethics, 2022
  • Garland, Andrew. “When Can I Act Forgiven?” Criswell Theological Review, Spring 2023
  • Garland, Andrew, Kevin Weinfurt, and Jeremy Sugarman. “Incentives and Payments in Pragmatic Clinical Trials: Scientific, Ethical, and Policy Considerations.” Clinical Trials, 2021 doi:10.1177/17407745211048178

Journal articles (contributor)

  • Morain, Stephanie R, et al. “Towards Meeting the Obligation of Respect for Persons in Pragmatic Clinical Trials:” Hastings Center Report, 2022

Book reviews

  • Garland, Andrew. “Uncertain Bioethics. Stephen Napier, 2022. New York, Routledge.” Journal of Moral Philosophy, forthcoming
  • Garland, Andrew. “For the Common Good. Alex John London, 2021. New York, Oxford University Press. 480 Pp, $99.00 (e-Book).” Journal of Applied Philosophy, June 3, 2022.

Encyclopedia Articles

  • “Atoms” and “Pierre Bayle,” in A Jonathan Edwards Encyclopedia, ed. Harry S. Stout, Kenneth Minkema, and Adriaan Neele (William B. Eerdmans, 2017).


  • “Respect for conscience and conscientious objection” Society for Christian Bioethicists, 2023
  • “No Harm in Asking” South Carolina Society for Philosophy, 2023 award for best faculty paper
  • “Consent and Conversation” APA Eastern Division poster, 2022
  • “Consent and Conversation” Berman Institute Research Retreat, 2021
  • “Incentives and Payments in Pragmatic Clinical Trials”, Ethics and Regulatory Group, NIH/VA/DOD Pain Management Collaboratory, December 2021
  • “Why Christians should be moral particularists” Evangelical Philosophical Society, 2021
  • “How does conscience justify prospective moral claims” Society for Christian Bioethics, 2021
  • “Can Conscience Provide Basic Moral Knowledge?” Evangelical Philosophical Society, 2016
  • Comments on “Intertheoretic Value Comparison: A Modest Proposal,” by Christian Tarsney, Virginia Philosophical Association, 2016
  • “Fanatics and Political Liberalism,” St. Louis University Graduate Conference, 2010
  • “Roger Williams and Liberty of Conscience,” University of Kentucky Graduate Conference, 2010
  • Comments on “Practical Reasoning and the Nature of Obedience” by Kory DeClark, Virginia Tech Graduate Philosophy Conference, 2010
  • Comments on “Roush’s Theory of Evidence: The Best of Both Worlds?” by Bengt Autzen, Virginia Tech Graduate Philosophy Conference, 2009
  • ”Divine Command Theory”, University of Virginia Ethics Tea Party, November 2014
  • Philosophy of Statistics Workshop, Virginia Tech, April 2009


Ethics in Public Health and Research, Fall 2023
Late Modern Philosophy, Fall 2023
Philosophy Seminar, Fall 2023
Aesthetics, Spring 2023
Biomedical Ethics, Spring 2023
Health Law and Ethics, Spring 2023
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Fall 2022
Research Ethics, 2022, 2023


  • DSMBs for NIH NIDDK, 2021-2023
  • Department representative to the Grad Council, University of Virginia, 2013-2014

Awards and Fellowships

  • Mellon Fellowship in Digital Humanities, 2014-2015

Dissertation Abstract

Conscience used to be a common topic in moral philosophy, but it has retreated into limited domains over the last 150 years or so. As a result, some of the variety of views about conscience have been lost. In the early modern British tradition, conscience frequently refers to a special cognitive faculty for acquiring particular moral knowledge about one’s own actions. This view fits the common-sense, ordinary view of conscience as used in other intellectual domains and in common discourse. On this view, conscience produces appearances of right and wrong by means of a distinctive kind of experience. Beliefs based on conscience are more like beliefs based on perception than on deliberation. This perceptual model explains why experiences of conscience can be so compelling and persistent, while also explaining why conscience is fallible. But conscience can still supply adequate grounds for rational beliefs about the moral quality of my actions. Conscience produces presentations of right and wrong, and these presentations are justified in ways similar to other commonplace presentations. Conscience’s limits do not make it useless, or even inferior to other sources of moral knowledge. This theory of conscience can explain the typical platitudes about conscience’s role in society. Conscience is a way to resist social consensus, even against state coercion. But it is not infallible or decisive. The folk conception of conscience can account for common intuitions about conscience in society better than other common conceptions of conscience. It is still worth cultivating a clear conscience, and common platitudes about respecting conscience remain in force.